Vietnamese commercial banks and corporate governance by Bace, Edward & Nguyen, Trang
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Bace, Edward ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4452-0350 and Nguyen, Trang (2019)
Vietnamese commercial banks and corporate governance. GATR Journal of Finance and
Banking Review, 4 (2) . pp. 73-81. ISSN 2636-9176 [Article] (doi:10.35609/jfbr.2019.4.2(4))
Final accepted version (with author’s formatting)
This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/27272/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain
is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study
without prior permission and without charge.
Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or
extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining
permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in
any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s).
Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the
author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag-
ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the
date of the award.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the
Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.




VIETNAMESE COMMERCIAL BANKS & CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: 2008-2016 
E. Bace and T. Nguyen, Middlesex University, e.bace@mdx.ac.uk 
ABSTRACT 
Objective: Corporate governance is a focus of bank managers and stakeholders, especially after the financial 
crisis.  Contributing to firm and bank difficulties is weakness in managing internally and externally, making 
governance critical; even moreso for banks which play a central role in the economy, allocating capital, 
lowering risk for businesses and individuals, and ensuring stability and sustainability. Bank failures in the 
crisis (2008-2012) highlighted governance and risk  in developed nations and in developing ones, such as 
Vietnam. This paper studies governance in bank performance and risk, using theoretical frameworks and 
empirical study.  
Methodology: Fundamental governance is reviewed, for banks in particular, in two widely used frameworks. 
Prior research relates bank performance (share return and return on assets, ROA), risk (capital adequacy 
ratio, CAR) and governance (board size, BS; number of committees, NC; independent directors to total, 
NID).  
Findings: As our models show, NC and NID relate positively to bank performance. CAR also has a positive 
link to governance.  
Novelty: Our recommendation is that banks in Vietnam must have effective boards to boost performance. 
Type of Paper: Empirical 
Keywords: governance; banking; Vietnam; performance 
JEL Classification: M14; D21; G21; G34 
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I- Objective 
In 2011, Vietnamese foreign-owned banks  with financial strength were endowed the same rights as 
domestic banks. The industry  became crowded, with market share harder to maintain. To develop 
sustainably, Vietnam’s banks must improve management and governance, with focus on risk and  
international governance standards. IFC’s survey (2011) showed most Vietnamese firms have “very basic 
knowledge of corporate governance”. Our study measures the relation between governance and 
performance in Vietnamese commercial banks. The topic’s significance and proposals should contribute to 
better governance and performance in this area. The study covers the period 2008-2016. In the crisis, not 
only Vietnamese banks but global ones were seriously affected: steady falls in share price, bankruptcy of 
big banks occurred. Vietnamese exchanges were slammed; shares of  banks and firms dropped; for some 
banks by as much as 50%, raising big questions of governance.  
There are studies on governance in Vietnam, especially for banks.  This study tests the relation of ROA and 
governance, using regression analysis. Our dependent variable is ROA, and independent variables are BS, 
NC and NID.  Our second test is risk (CAR) and governance. Variables of return and CAR is obtained from 
Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2015) and annual reports. 
II- Literature review/Technique 
 2.1 Corporate governance definition 
Corporate governance varies in countries because of diverse legal systems, cultures, and market 
developments, where much research has typically focused. Corporate governance was defined as (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997): “how finance suppliers to firms assure return on investment”. Deeper insight is given by 
‘Principles of Corporate Governance’ by the Organization for Economic Co-operation & Development 
(OECD, 1999): “relations between management, shareholders, stakeholders, systems for goals, attaining 
and monitoring same.”  Though similar, governance and management differ. Management uses tools to 
manage, governance provides a framework for transparency, accountability (Dieu & Hau, 2014), and 
occupies a higher level: firms must be well governed  to protect stakeholders and pursue firm goals.  
Governance eludes definition due to diverse views under varied condition. Walker’s three main elements 
(2009) are as follows: 
- Corporate governance relates to structure of deciding firm goals and methods of reaching them. 
- Corporate governance controls regulations among all stakeholders to resolve conflicts of 
interest between owners and managers. 
- Adopted governance principles in different countries are the result of different complex 
systems of rules, acts, norms, traditions and procedures. 
Internally, governance represents internal commitments, agreements, relationship establishment, rights, 
obligations, roles and responsibilities of groups such as board of directors, executives, shareholders and 
minorities (Thanh & Ha, 2016). Agreements are made by firm regulations, and labor rules. External 




Accountability builds stakeholder trust. Cost of capital relies on risk, and investor perception; high risk, 
high cost of capital (low firm value). Good governance aids firms to raise needed funds (Dieu & Hau, 2014): 
contributing to lower interest, availability of  long-term credit, and high valuation.  
Good governance helps firm reputation (Harrison, 2007). Well governed firms respect stakeholders, 
boosting reputation by transparency/accountability. Governance mitigates conflicts between managers and 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 2000). The latter focus on maximizing wealth, but executives may be more 
interested to protect their position. How shareholders want their investment managed may differ from 
managers; problems arise, through conflicts among shareholders due to owner diversity.  The OECD (2004) 
lists 5 mitigants, namely: “1) hostile takeover, 2) concentration of ownership and control in big shareholders, 
3) delegating partial control to big creditors, 4) board control of CEO, 5) aligning managers with 
shareholders through compensation”. 
 2.3 Corporate mechanism 
Governance is internal and external (endogenous and exogenous; Thanh & Ha, 2016). Firms work 
endogenously (Llewellyn & Sinha, 2000) for accountability.  Foremost here is the board who oversee the 
firm and bridge with the stakeholders. The board monitors the CEO on shareholders’ behalf. Most research 
has focused on board composition and independence. Independent directors usually strengthen the board, 
boosting effectiveness. The more board independence, the more easily inadequate CEOs can be replaced. 
Other studies suggest no conclusive evidence on independence (Becht, 2007). External mechanisms 
regulate  managers/directors, avoiding inequity, and intransparency (Thanh & Ha, 2016); an external force 
with power to discipline besides the market. 
 2.3 Agency theories and Stewardship theories 
Agency theory looks at principals and agents (shareholders and managers). Ownership and control differ; 
owners suffer from self-regarding agents. Often executives act in their own interest: such as power/job 
security/income, not long-term shareholder return (James & Houston, 1995). Agency theory views such 
problems and risk attitudes. Issues arise, as owners cannot verify managers’ motives. In early stages of 
economics, studies found managers not always acting for shareholders; incentive divergence raises costs 
(Ciancanelli & Gonzalez, 2000). Agency theory tries to align interests in order to lower costs (Shankman, 
1999); these are agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; shareholders), agent cost (principals), residual 
loss: manager decisions versus what shareholders want. 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship conveys a duty to others based on the intent to honour contracted 
relationships. Stewardship (Hernandez, 2012) explains how individuals sacrifice their own interests for 
others. Most governance theories start from self-interest, but stewardship rejects this; managers seek other 
ends besides financial ones. Managers still must do well, raise profits, bringing shareholder returns (Binh 
& Giang, 2012). The board must define manager roles and expectations, being goal-oriented, for manager 
ability and worth. 
 2.4 Banks and corporate governance 
In financial markets, banks are prime intermediaries given their role in the market and economy. Bank 
governance is critical to prevent crises. Our first instruction in governance, global in scope, is the 1999 
Basel framework, reviewed in 2006 based on 2004 OECD standards. This scheme instructs managers and 
boards, also mandating minimum capital to protect banks, and promote transparency, market discipline 




stakeholder needs (Basel, 1999). Most important is the board, appointed by shareholders. It is necessary 
(Gruening & Bratanovic, 2003) to have a strong, independent and active board closely involved in bank 
activities. The board is responsible to oversee and support management, to examine recommendations 
before approving. Good controls allow them to identify and address concerns before major problems arise. 
Involved and active boards help banks survive if they assess problems and take action. Board roles have 
been widely studied, with a common focus on composition and independence. Composition and board size 
relate to an ability to monitor CEOs (Binh & Giang, 2012; Yung, 2009). Other studies form opposite 
conclusions. Belkhir (2008) found no significant relation between board size and composition of banks and 
performance in a US study. 
Good governance is structured between board, executives, staff and shareholders to pursue shareholder 
interests, factoring in all stakeholders. Relevant aspects are board size, committees, and director 
independence, which we use for hypotheses. Governance in 20 Vietnam banks is gauged in these variables.  
Banks are interested intermediaries, which explains the relation between governance and risk. Investors 
(Binh & Giang, 2012) care about investment return but also how risk is distributed. Better governance raises 
expected return and improves risk management. Due to bank risks, governance outlines risk management 
in various ways. A common method is CAR (capital over risk-weighted assets).  Performance and risk 
management interact, and both depend on governance. As risks are managed better, managers raise 
performance. Banks enjoy better reputation and public image to lower their cost of capital and other sources 
of funds. With good risk management, banks operate with lower capital (Serbee & Alix, 2015). Costs are 
saved, and banks can invest in riskier projects to yield better returns. 
 
There have been various studies on the topic: the influence of governance on performance and risk 
management.  Black, Jang and Kim (2003) found a positive correlation. Klapper and Love (2003) examined 
14 stock markets and found better governance had high correlation with performance and market value.  
Before the crisis of 1991, Japanese boards did not well monitor their banks, which operated poorly, up to 
the crisis. Afterwards, many directors were replaced, and bank performance improved (Christopher & Terry, 
2004), which depended highly on boards. Southeast Asian privatized banks (William & Nghia, 2005) 
performed better with strict board control. Other studies suggest the opposite. Prowse (1997) found most 
governance failure was on the part of regulators, not boards. Simpson and Gleason (1999) found little effect 
of governance on performance.  
In Vietnam, study of this relation has been relatively neglected. Most research has been done in US and 
Europe. As Vietnam is rapidly developing, affected seriously by the financial crisis, especially in banking, 
it is instructive to study the influence of governance on performance, to help banks achieve better 
performance.  
IV- Methodology 
4.1 Research hypotheses 
H1: Good corporate governance has a significantly positive impact on profitability of banks 
 




4.2 Research methodology 
Governance theories considered are agency theory, stewardship and stakeholder theory; this study focuses 
on the agency aspect, boards and performance of managers (agents), developed from theoretical governance 
frameworks (Macey & O’Hara, 2001) and the Triangle Framework (Tandellilin et al., 2007). The regression 
model by Praptiningsih (2009) also partially applies. Macey and O’Hara focus on internal controls, relating 
to board (size, composition) and performance. The Triangle Framework explores three aspects: board, risk 
and performance.  
4.3 Data sample 
Stemming from the concentration of research methodology, variables for this study are summarized as 
follows: 
Bank performance: ROA is used; ROE may be the closest measure of shareholder investment return, but it 
is easy to manipulate equity accounts. ROA measures bank efficiency of assets to generate profit, dividing 
net profit by total assets. ROA is based on annual returns of 20 Vietnamese banks over nine years.  
Risk management: our study uses CAR (ratio of bank capital to its risks, sum of tier 1 and 2 capital over 
risk weighted assets, Damodaran, 2004). ADB report (2015) and subsequent annual reports show CAR for 
Vietnam’s banks 2008-2016. 
Board of directors: Measured by the following proxies: 
- Board size (BS): number of people elected by shareholders, collected from bank annual reports. 
- Board composition: NID. Independents have no material relation with firm or related persons 
besides sitting fee (Damodaran, 2004). This study tests NID versus ROA and, CAR. 
- Committees: NC. Committees of board members with specific duties play important roles in 
helping boards make decisions. In theory, there are at least four committees often appointed by 
firms, namely audit, remuneration, nomination and risk committee (Cadbury, 1992). Audit is 
charged with internal controls: approving financial statements and other documents before 
agreement by full board, communicating with external auditors, reporting to shareholders. This 
committee often consists of independent non-executive directors with at least one member 
having experience in finance. Remuneration decides executive compensation. Nomination 
committee identifies candidates for director and executive positions. Risk committee advises 
board on risk and strategy, considering board risk tolerance, and firm capacity to manage risks 
within agreed strategy. 
4.4 Population and sample 
At end 2016, 38 Vietnam commercial banks consisted of 5 state-owned, 33 joint-stock, 5 foreign-owned, 
and 5 joint-venture banks. We focus on the biggest 20 commercial banks, due to data limitations.  
Regression examines the relation between governance indicators and performance.  This methodology is 
used often in research testing the relation among variables (Binh & Giang, 2012; Tsorhe et al., 2011). 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) is applied. Regression tests the relation with ROA, , CAR, BS, NID, NC. 
Equations are as follows: 





CAR= y1*BS + y2* NC + y3*NID + intercept α 
Above, α is coefficient of BS and ROA, β is coefficient of NC and ROA, a is coefficient of NID and ROA, 
intercept α is model coefficient. For CAR model regression; yx is coefficient of variables and CAR, intercept 
α is model coefficient. 
V- Findings 
5.1 Results 
Regression for ROA checked the relation between NIC, BS, NC and ROA of the 20 banks. Result of 
regression are as follows: 
ROA                  = -0.005*BS + 0.009*NC + 0.919*NID + 0.65 
t-stat                        (-0.11)             (0.14)         (3.22)                                R2 = 5.67% 
The result shows our first hypothesis to be valid, that good governance has a directly positive impact on 
ROA. Since R-squared is low, governance indicators have a positive effect on ROA but the influence is not 
strong, or significant.  Next, the relation between CAR and BS, NC and NID is tested. The result is presented 
here:  
CAR                  = -0.004*BS + 0.002*NC + 0.017*NID + 0.13 
t-stat                        (-1.85)             (-0.85)         (1.52)                                R2 = 4.04% 
BS also has a negative impact on CAR, not strong enough to have a big impact on CAR (R-squared only 
4.04%).  
5.2 Discussion 
NC and NID have a positive relation with performance (ROA). Expected advantages to big boards are better 
advice and networks, and better decisions. Larger boards intuitively make better decisions with diverse 
abilities and experience. Not only promoting better engagement in discussions and decision-making, board 
diversity in theory helps minimize power in the hands of a small number of directors. Yet this view is not 
consistent; other studies, like ours, show a negative relation of these two variables (Belkhir, 2006), or 
statistical insignificance of BS on performance (Praptiningsih, 2009). Big boards bring advantages and 
disadvantages. Research suggests increase in BS leads to better performance, but too big a board has an 
opposite impact. Excessively big boards may make it more difficult and time consuming to make good 
decisions. Guest (2009) showed excessively big boards lead to a negative and inefficient relation between 
BS and performance. Many banks and firms succeed with small boards. Bank size has a big effect on the 
relation of BS and performance. The ideal number for boards differs based on firm size and regulation. 
Blenko et al. (2010) suggested optimal boards should have seven members. Takagi (2009) suggested at 
least three, no more than 15. This implies no “one size fits all” due to differences in markets and nations. 
Optimal BS may be 7-10 depending on bank size and regulation.   
Positive relation of NC and performance shows committees have strong governance roles. They help 
manage banks and shareholder communication. Yet in Vietnamese banks, they are less relevant, with a low 
coefficient between NC and performance. As with other banks in the world, Vietnam bank boards often 




remuneration and risk. In 2012, almost all Vietnam’s banks had four committees or more, but not before 
2012.  Among the three variables, NID has the biggest impact on performance, with the highest coefficient. 
NID affects performance differently. The more board independence, the better it can operate. Banks with 
more independents make better decisions based on shareholder interest. This reduces conflicts between 
shareholders and agents. The study highlights the importance of NID in boards statistically as a rise in NID 
raises ROA. Some banks still lack independents, but are few, often not operating well since boards may act 
based on own interests rather than shareholders. Conflicts between agents and shareholders rise with non-
independent directors.  
In our second model, all three independent variables have low CAR relation; this is reasonable in short run 
as this work covers 9 years, including financial crisis. The higher the CAR, the safer the bank, with equity 
risk reduced, and lower expected ROE. In theory, higher CAR works for better governance. Yet recent 
studies show in the financial crisis, capital composition undermined owner incentives; banks paid dividend 
and issued capital as debt and preferred stock, unbalancing priority of obligation, shifting risk (Acharya, 
2009). In crisis, good governance led not to higher CAR. Investors like risk as higher risk implies higher 
return; lower CAR likely in the short term attracts investment. Besides raising equity, banks may raise CAR 
by reducing risk-weighted assets. This lowers risk, unattractive to risky investors. Banks with good risk 
management likely have less capital to reduce cost of capital. This capital is invested in risky projects with 
good returns. Banks with good governance can afford low CAR, thus the inverse relation to CAR and 
governance, which studies show (Binh & Tam, 2014). Tshorhe et al. (2011) show better governance in 
banks with less capital, subject to minimum requirement. Studies also suggest this may not hold long term 
as good capital structure and CAR can raise public trust. 
VI- Novelty 
This work studied the relation in governance and performance (ROA) and risk (CAR). Different variables 
tested were BS, NC and NID. Vietnam’s banks are at the very start of governance, examined in this paper, 
with successful regression models. A positive relation is noted in performance and governance. NID 
coefficient is highest, implying this most affects performance; NID rise grows ROA. This validates our 
hypotheses: good governance has significant positive impact on performance. Our second hypothesis is 
also valid, indicating better governance could raise CAR though slightly; likely this is true short term as 
study covers 2008-2016. Longer term, the result may differ. In short, governance has neither positive or 
negative significant effect on bank CAR. 
As policy recommendation, banks must ensure boards are fully qualified, and understand governance. 
Boards must not be swayed by managers or outside concerns. They must protect stakeholder interests; in 
Vietnam up to now, only main shareholders have been considered. We recommend raising NID and NC. 
Banks must promote risk management, and empower boards with risk committees, eg internal audit. 
Committees must be independent, objective in assessing through internal controls with board/managers. 
Clear policies/processes ensure timely action against risk. Vietnamese banks can learn from foreign banks 
with risk experience.     
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